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The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating -and Extending -Persson and Tabellini 1 Introduction
In their monograph "The Economic Effects of Constitutions", Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (for short PT, 2003) ask whether specific constitutional rules cause systematic differences in economic outcomes. More specifically, PT ask what economic effects two constitutional institutions, namely the form of government (presidential vs. parliamentary systems) and the electoral system (majoritarian vs.
proportional, but also size of the electoral district, number of individual vs. list candidates) have on three groups of economically relevant variables: (1) fiscal policy (government expenditure, tax revenue, budget surplus, share of social welfare spending), (2) government efficiency (absence of corruption, graft) and (3) productivity (both labor and total factor productivity). Their results are striking: All else equal, presidential systems have significantly lower government expenditure than parliamentary systems, but also lower tax revenue, a lower budget deficit, and spend less on social and welfare programs. The results are similar -but substantially less significant -with regard to majoritarian systems. Most strikingly, if the presidential form of government and majoritarian electoral rules are combined, central government expenditure is more than 10 percent of GDP less than in the benchmark case of parliamentary government and proportional electoral rules! With regard to government efficiency, PT find the size of the electoral district and the proportion of candidates not nominated via party lists to be hugely influential. The larger the district size and the higher the share of individual candidates, the higher government efficiency turns out to be. Finally, presidential systems seem to be rather inimical to improvements in both labor and total factor productivity. These results are, however, only significant on the ten percent level.
The book turned out to be an instant success. Simultaneously, the adequacy of the methods used by the two authors has been questioned. In his review for the Journal of Economic Literature, Daron Acemoglu (2005, 1033) writes: "If the results indeed correspond to the causal effects of the form of government and electoral rules on policies and economic outcomes as PT claim, we have learned more with this book than from the entire comparative politics literature of the past fifty years." Yet, Acemoglu believes the if to be very big and continues: "Despite these remarkable results, there are reasons to question whether this research has successfully uncovered causal effects. The OLS and matching estimates ultimately rely on the exogeneity of political institutions. Nevertheless, political institutions are equilibrium outcomes, determined by various social factors that are not fully controlled for in the empirical models." Acemoglu's critique suggests that the search for better instruments ought to be on the agenda. Here, a different approach is chosen: PT rely on two data sets, their larger one encompasses 85 countries. We wanted to know whether their results are robust to the inclusion of additional countries. We extend their data set with up to 31 additional countries. It is noteworthy that the average of an indicator proxying for the degree of political rights and civil liberties that citizens enjoy (the Gastil Index) slighty improves as a consequence of this broader dataset.
Based on the broader dataset, we find that the effects of presidential systems on fiscal policies largely vanish, whereas the effects of electoral rules could be replicated.
With regard to government efficiency, the results are less clear-cut than in the PT sample. In many regressions the indicators used to proxy for the characteristics of the electoral system are not significant anymore. Concerning output per worker, PT find that both presidential government forms as well as majoritarian electoral rules have marginally significant negative effects. As soon as our larger sample is used, the results resemble the other findings: the presidential variable loses its significance whereas the negative effect of majoritarian electoral systems on output per worker are largely confirmed. The significance of both the proportion of individual candidates as well as the size of the electoral district could also be reconfirmed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes the PT results in a little more detail, the following section describes the various extensions to the PT datasets. Section 4 contains both the replications of the original PT estimates as well as a number of extensions. Section 5 concludes and discusses a number of open questions.
Summarizing Persson and Tabellini

Preliminary Remarks
The most fundamental question of PT could be summarized as "Do constitutional rules have economically relevant effects?" More concretely, the authors ask whether different government forms (presidential vs. parliamentary systems) and electoral systems (majoritarian vs. proportional, but also size of electoral districts and proportion of individual as opposed to list candidates) are correlated with a number of economically relevant variables. This section describes a number of theoretical conjectures according to which government form and electoral rules could have economically relevant effects (2.2), reports the criteria chosen by PT for ascertaining the two constitutional institutions as well as those used to choose the countries to be included in their database (2.3), depicts the dependent variables (2.4) and portrays the empirical results.
The Underlying Theory
Form of Government
The conjecture that presidential systems can systematically create incentives different from parliamentary systems is inspired by the concept of separation of powers. The basic idea is that in presidential systems, the separation of powers is stronger than in parliamentary ones. In order to remain in power, most presidents do not depend on the continued support of the majority of parliament. In most parliamentary systems, the chief executive does, however, depend on being able to secure a parliamentary majority. In a number of previous papers, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997, 2000) had argued that it was easier for legislatures to collude with the executive in parliamentary systems which is why they expect both higher tax rates as well as higher corruption levels than in presidential systems. They further argue that the majority (of both voters and legislators) in parliamentary systems can pass spending programs whose benefits are clearly targeted at themselves, implying that they are able to make themselves better off to the detriment of the minority. This is why Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) predict that both taxes and government expenditures will be higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems.
Electoral Rules
The insight that electoral rules can have a crucial effect on the number of parties has been recognized for a long time. Duverger's (1954) observation that constitutions providing for first-past-the-post or majority rule often induce two party systems, whereas systems that provide for proportional representation often induce the existence of more parties has even been coined "Duverger's law" in order to express its general validity. Although this has been known for long, occupation with the economic consequences of electoral systems has just begun. It has been argued (Austen-Smith 2000) that since the number of parties presented in parliament is higher under proportional representation, tax rates will not be decided upon by one single party but will be the result of legislative bargaining between a variety of parties with different constituents. This would explain that tax rates are, on average, higher under proportional representation than under majority rule. Lizzeri and Persico (2001) compare the composition of government spending under alternative electoral rules.
They distinguish between the provision of a genuine public good on the one hand and of pork-barrel projects that serve redistributive purposes on the other and ask whether incentives to provide these goods differ systematically between systems with majority rule (called "winner-take-all systems" by them) and proportional representation. In majority rule systems, politicians have incentives to cater to the preferences of those who can help them to get the plurality of the votes. They will do so by promising pork barrel projects. In proportional representation systems, on the other hand, targeting makes less sense because every vote counts which is why politicians will provide more public goods. Their prediction is, hence, that the composition of the government budget will be different depending on the electoral regime.
PT deal with two additional aspects of electoral systems, namely (1) district size and
(2) ballot structure. District size refers to the number of legislators of a voting district.
Suppose single member districts are combined with plurality rule. Under such an institutional setting, a party only needs some 25% of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts; Buchanan and Tullock 1962) . Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with proportional representation. Here, a party needs some 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under proportional representation strong incentives to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted on the constituents' preferences.
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) obtain a similar result. In large districts, legislators will primarily represent socioeconomic groups whereas in small districts, they will primarily represent geographical interests. Transfers would be a suitable instrument for paying allegiance to social constituencies whereas (local) public goods would be better suited for those paying geographical allegiance. They assume that in majoritarian systems just one representative is elected in each district, whereas in proportional systems, more than one representative is elected. Given this assumption, proportional systems will be spending more on transfers, whereas majoritarian systems will be spending more on (local) public goods. They test their model with 20 OECD and 20 Latin American countries and find that, as predicted, transfers are higher under proportional representation. Going beyond the simple dichotomy between majoritarian and proportional systems, they find that higher degrees of proportionality are correlated with higher degrees of transfer spending (as opposed to public goods spending).
The effects of differences in the ballot structure is the last aspect of electoral systems to be considered. What is at stake here is how voters cast their ballots, i.e. whether they vote for individual candidates or for party lists. Often, majority rule systems rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less into their campaigns under proportional representation than under majority rule. Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 9 ) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher, the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators to legislators who are delegated by their parties.
Operationalizing Institutions
With regard to government forms, PT constructed a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 in presidential regimes and 0 otherwise (PRES). All regimes in which the confidence of the lower house is not necessary for the executive to stay in power are defined as presidential, i.e. are coded 1. This implies that countries can be classified as presidential even if they do not have an elected president. Switzerland is, accordingly, coded as "presidential" although it does not have a directly elected president, whereas France is coded as "non presidential" because for his survival, the French prime minister depends on a confidence vote of parliament.
Concerning electoral rules, PT also constructed a dummy variable. If the entire lower house in a country is elected under plurality rule, it takes on the value of 1, 0 otherwise (MAJ). But relying exclusively on a dummy variable might be too coarse a brush. This is why PT constructed three more fine grained continuous measures: The first one is a proxy for the district magnitude defined here as the number of electoral districts divided by the number of legislators in the lower house. For the U.K., the variable MAGN takes on the value of 1, for Israel, which has one electoral district covering the entire nation, a value of close to 0. If all legislators are elected via party lists, voters will have a hard time monitoring their legislators, and it will be less risky to be corrupt. This is why PT created a variable PIND that indicates the proportion of legislators elected by plurality rule via a vote on individuals (as opposed to party lists). For the U.K., it takes on the value of 1, for Poland the value of 0 because all of PT call the average of these two indicators "GASTIL" commemorating the founder of the datasets. Freedom House codes the countries from 1 ("free") to 7 ("nonfree"). In order to be included in their sample, the average of this score had to be lower than 5 for the period from 1990 to 1998. -Total factor productivity also for 1988 (LOGA).
The Dependent Variables
The Empirical Results
Government Form
PT's results are quite impressive: (1) Government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential than in parliamentary systems.
(2) The size of the welfare state is some two to three percent lower in presidential systems. These results are stunning indeed. PT claim that the consequences of presidential regimes and majoritarian electoral systems are largely additive. If a parliamentary proportional country introduced a presidential-majoritarian system, government size would be decreased by a "whopping 10% of GDP" (PT 160). In the next section, we want to ask a number of questions regarding their approach, discuss a number of possible extensions and present some extensions factually carried out here.
Extensions
Possible Extensions
At least four possible extensions come to mind: (1) the robustness of the results given that the codings are slightly modified, sample size is changed, outliers are included/excluded and the period for which the coefficients are estimated is changed.
(2) Inclusion of additional control variables might change the results.
(3) Given that the constitutional variables have any effects on the chosen dependent variables, one would like to know more about the transmission channels through which the effects are produced. (4) Institutions are man-made which means that there is always a potential endogeneity problem that needs to be dealt with. We now set out to deal with these possible extensions in a little more detail and begin with the robustness of the results.
The results depend on the specific definition of the independent variables chosen. If minor modifications make the results disappear, they are not robust. Hence, a possible extension would be to rely on variables created for similar purposes but based on slightly different criteria. It could also be the case that dummy variables are too coarse and that the explicit recognition of additional criteria (president elected directly by population, by an electoral college or drawing on yet another election mode?) would lead to more fine-grained indicators. But the exact delineation of the dependent variables is just as important. With regard to government expenditurewhich is part of the group of fiscal policy variables -PT confine their analysis to central government expenditure whereas total government expenditure is not used.
They motivate this choice by both better data availability and comparability (37f.) and argue that where both measures are available, they are highly correlated (r ≈ 0.9).
Yet, it could be that their results are not robust to drawing on total government expenditure, and we propose to use it as an alternative dependent variable. 1
Further, it could be that the cut-off criterion employed by PT introduces systematic bias into their regressions: Suppose that the large majority of countries excluded due to their bad rankings in political freedom and civil liberties were presidential systems.
This could taint the results in favor of presidential systems. It might therefore make sense to broaden the dataset and check the robustness of the results by including a larger number of countries. Eventually, the results might also be influenced by a small number of outliers, hence explicitly checking whether the residuals are normally distributed could be an important check.
We now move on to the second group of potential extensions dealing with control variables: In their paper on the effects of electoral systems on the amount of redistribution, Iversen and Soskice (2003) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems have been center right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments have been center-left under PR. But if that is the case, a closer look at the transmission mechanism that leads from electoral systems to government expenditures is needed because it is unclear if the difference is due to the constitutional rule or due to the different ideologies of government -and the population at large. A second possible extension would be to add control variables, e.g. one controlling for the ideological orientation of governments.
This leads us directly to a third possible extension dealing with transmission channels. According to PT, presidential systems do better than parliamentary ones with regard to a number of different criteria. Yet, at the end of the day, when it comes 1 In a study that draws on the framework of PT but is interested in the economic effects of direct democracy, Voigt and Blume (2006) find that the distinction between total and central government expenditure (revenue) can be important: a higher degree of direct democracy is correlated with lower total government expenditure (albeit insignificantly) but also with higher central government revenue.
to income and growth (i.e. productivity development), parliamentary systems seem to have an advantage over presidential ones, if only on a low level of significance. Ex ante, the effects of fiscal policy on productivity are unclear because it can be both productivity enhancing as well as diminishing. Prima facie, one would, however, expect countries that have advantages in government efficiency to do better in terms of productivity. But this not what PT find. It would, hence, be interesting to inquire more specifically into the possible transmission channels through which the two constitutional institutions under consideration affect total factor productivity.
The likelihood that formal institutions will be factually enforced possibly is a function of the kind of institution formally promulgated. It could, e.g., be that politicians have a higher likelihood of breaking with the rules of the game under presidential than under parliamentary institutions, although the formal degree of separation is higher under the former. Presidents often claim that they are the only ones who represent the people as a whole. This might make them more audacious than, e.g., prime ministers in reneging upon constitutional constraints. Political parties are regularly weaker in presidential than in parliamentary systems. 2 This might further increase the incentives of presidents not to take constitutional rules too seriously: if parties are weak, the possibility to produce opposition against a president who reneges upon the constitution might be less than in systems with strong political parties. A reduced likelihood of opposition does, of course, make reneging upon constitutional rules more beneficial. There might be yet another transmission mechanism concerned with political parties. Brennan and Kliemt (1994) show that organizations like political parties often develop longer time horizons than individual politicians: whereas presidents will be out after one or two terms (as in Mexico or the U.S.), political parties might opt for staying in power indefinitely (like in Japan). If the discount rate of presidents is indeed higher than that of, say, prime ministers or party leaders, this might also let offenses against formal constitutional rules appear more beneficial to presidents than to prime ministers. It would, hence, be desirable to 2 "Strong" and "weak" here refers to the organizational structure of parties; they are called "strong" if they have many paying members who are active in both political office but also follow political events closely. Due to the organizational structure, strong political parties have the capacity to mobilize many people within a short period of time. This might enable them to produce focal points different from those that the executive would like to create. Executives in an environment with strong parties are expected to be more likely to play by the constitutional rules than executives in an environment with weak parties.
have a better metric allowing to compare systematically the differences between constitutional institutions and constitutional reality.
These arguments thus call for a third extension, namely to deal more closely with the transmission mechanisms at play here. It might make sense to think about additional independent variables: It could, e.g., be that the willingness to pay taxes is a reflection of the perceived legitimacy of a political system which might, in turn, depend on some constitutional institutions.
A fourth potential extension is to take the endogeneity of constitutional rules explicitly into account. PT call their book "The Economic Effects of Constitutions". Thus, they do not try to explain the emergence of different forms of government in any detail. Institutions are, however, always man-made and it is hence critical to adequately control for that. A possible extension would, hence, be to use better instruments than those factually used by PT.
Extensions Carried Out
Not all of the potential extensions mentioned in the last subsection are carried out here. In fact, we limit ourselves to the most straightforward ones, namely to the robustness of PT's results. More specifically, five major modifications are presented here: (1) the dataset is enlarged, (2) an alternative measure for the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems is used, (3) the measures for productivity are recalculated for the year 2000 instead of the year 1988, (4) a number of control variables are added and (5) total government expenditure is used in addition to central government expenditure. We now move on to describe these extensions.
The first -and supposedly also the most important -extension consists of enlarging the database. We decided to include all countries that carried out free elections in the 1990ies (according to Golder 2005) and for which a sufficient amount of data were available. This led to the inclusion of 31 additional countries (a list can be found in appendix 1). This changes the composition of the dataset and some of the changes are highlighted here: the proportion of African countries has increased which we consider as a plus since African countries are underrepresented in the PT dataset. Relatedly, our average country is closer to the equator than PT's. Our average country is significantly smaller, the population is younger, and the ethnolinguistic fractionalization is higher than in the smaller sample. In terms of economic variables, per capita income is smaller as is labor as well as total factor productivity. In terms of religion, the proportion of both catholic and protestant countries is higher, and, inversely, the proportion of Confucian countries lower. On average, countries are younger in the broad sample, and the proportion of the population that speaks English as their first language is higher than in the PT sample.
Amazingly, the average of the Gastil index (that was used by PT as their cut-off criterion) is slightly lower in our sample, implying that on average, the countries in our extended dataset enjoy a higher degree of political freedom and civil liberties (based on the average of their ratings from 1990 to 1999) . 3 On the other hand, the extension countries are newer democracies, government efficiency is lower and corruption significantly higher (table A3 in the appendix contains a comparison of the statistical averages of the PT dataset, the added countries as well as newly created larger dataset).
For coding the various aspects of electoral rules, we relied on a dataset provided by Matt Golder (2005) who defines a presidential regime as "one in which the government serves at the pleasure of the elected president. The president may be directly or indirectly elected; the important feature is that the president selects and determines the survival of government" (ibid., 117). In turn, the coding of the variable proxying for the form of government was done by consulting the countries' constitutions (the coding for both the electoral rules as well as the form of government can be found in appendices 1 and 3). Drawing on an alternative measure of government form serves to check the robustness of PT's results and is our second extension.
The third extension is a recalculation of both labor and total factor productivity. PT take the two measures of productivity from Hall and Jones (1999) covers the Government share of real GDP using a fixed base, the reference year being 1996. We have used the average of this indicator for the 1990s.
Estimations
Introductory Remarks
This section serves to test the robustness of PT's results after having carried out the modifications proposed in the last section of the paper. In order to be certain that possible differences are not due to different datasets, different software programs etc., we begin all estimations by replicating the original model of PT. In order to keep our results as reader-friendly as possible, all tables are constructed in an identical fashion:
(1) The first column simply reports the results as found in PT (2003) .
(2) The second column contains an exact replication of that model.
(3) The third column contains the regression based on the larger dataset.
(4) If there are more columns, the underlying modifications (e.g. an updated dependent variable, additional controls and so on) are explicitly specified.
In order to ensure readability of the paper, we do not display all the control variables included in the various regressions but simply the ones that we are interested in here. 5 In order not to overburden the paper, we confine ourselves to OLS estimates here (or WLS where PT used them, too). 6 Following PT, in parentheses underneath the coefficients we display standard errors, significance levels are indicated as *** (one percent), ** (five percent), and * (ten percent).
5
The complete estimates can be assessed via our webpage at: http://www.unimarburg.de/fb02/insecon. 6 Due to problems of data availability, we do not replicate PT's estimates with regard to central government expenditures on social services and welfare as a percentage of GDP as well as the Budget Surplus.
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Expenditure
The replication of the PT estimate leads to exactly identical results (column 2). With regard to presidential regimes, inclusion of the additional countries reduces both the size of the coefficient as well as its level of significance. This is true regardless of As soon as total government expenditure is used as the dependent variable (columns 8 and 9), the picture changes substantially again: In this case, neither the form of government nor the electoral system display any significant influence. In both the original PT sample (column 8) and in our extended sample (column 9), only two variables turn out to be highly significant: first, OECD membership leads to a significantly lower level of total government expenditure (on the one percent level of significance; OECD membership is, c.p., correlated with an expenditure level of some 12% less than non OECD members!). Secondly, and as expected, the age structure has an influence on total government expenditure: the higher the proportion of the population above 65, the higher the expenditure level, the higher the proportion of the population aged between 15 and 64, the lower the expenditure level.
Government Revenue
Estimating the effects of the constitutional variables on government revenue rather than government expenditure does not really change the picture: extending the country sample makes the PRES variable insignificant for explaining differences in government revenue. This is true regardless of whether PT's or Golder's coding is used. It is also noteworthy that the MAJ variable which remained insignificant in the original estimate (column 1) now turns out to be significant at the ten percent level. This is, astonishingly, true not only when the sample is broadened but also when it is diminished in size (in order to be able to use the Golder variable instead of PT's PRES). These general insights remain true for all variations in which government revenue serves as the dependent variable which is why we refrain from reporting them here. The Jarque-Bera statistic in columns 2 and 3 indicates that the residuals are not normally distributed; the actual values for Botswana and Brazil were both more than 2.5 standard deviations away from their predicted values. Exclusion of these two countries makes the Jarque-Bera statistic insignificant, i.e. secures the normal distribution of the residuals. 
Political Rents
PT use three proxies for political rents, namely the amount of graft as contained in the governance indicators provided by Kaufmann et al. (1999) . The other indicator also focusing on corruption is the so-called Corruption Perception Index provided by Transparency International. The variable government effectiveness is also drawn from the governance indicators provided by Kaufmann et al. (1999) . PT put an emphasis on the graft indicator as it is available for the largest number of countries.
Graft
Comparing the PT estimate with our replication reveals some differences which can Summing up our results so far, it is the electoral system rather than the form of government that explains the variation in the dependent variables. It is, hence, interesting to have a closer look at the details of the electoral system to ascertain what specific institutional provision is responsible for the difference. Following PT (192/195), we include three variables proxying for the electoral system into one equation in table 4 (although they are highly correlated among themselves). As soon as the sample is extended, the MAJ variable has additional explanatory power. This also remains the case if the sample size is reduced (columns 4 and 5; due to countries covered in the Golder data). The replications also show that the effect of PIND is not very robust: based on a smaller sample (columns 4 and 5 again) it is significant on the five percent level, based on the extended Golder set (columns 6 and 7), it is not significant anymore. This is further re-enforced if the estimate is done on the basis of OLS: in the 79 country sample, only MAGN turns out to be significant. 
Corruption
The next couple of regressions use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as the dependent variable (tables 5 and 6). Due to data availability, the larger sample contains only 3 more countries than the original PT dataset. These are Albania, Mongolia, and Ghana. 9 It is noteworthy that this minor extension makes PIND lose its significance entirely and MAGN shrink from the one to the ten percent level.
Other modifications (using the Golder variable instead of that used by PT) also lets MAGN use its significance. As in many tables before, the form of government does not seem to have any impact, in this case on the CPI. In sum, the form of government does not have a robust effect on political rents.
Although the electoral rule (majoritarian vs. proportional) becomes significant in a number of extensions, it is not significant in all equations. What seems to have the most important effect is the size of the electoral districts: the smaller it is, the higher the predicted level of graft or corruption. 10 10 It seems noteworthy that the two single most important predictors for low political rents are (1) a high per capita income (in log form) and (2) OECD membership.
Productivity
The last dependent variable analyzed by PT is the effect of their constitutional institutions on labor as well as total factor productivity. The data they use for the two productivity measures are taken from Hall and Jones (1999) who calculated them for the year 1988. They find that both presidential as well as majoritarian systems are harmful to both measures, albeit in an insignificant way. We extend PT's findings in two directions here: first, we ask whether we find the same effects of the constitutional variables on productivity using the larger dataset. Second, we recalculate both productivity measures for the year 2000 and compare the coefficients with those obtained from the other regressions.
Output Per Worker
In line with our previous results on fiscal policy and government effectiveness, the presidential variable is not significantly robust for explaining differences in output per worker (LOGYL) either (table 7) . This is also the case with regard to MAJ for the extended sample (column 3) as well as the modified coding of the presidential variable (columns 5 and 6). As soon as the more recent data for output per worker are used, MAJ regains the same level of significance as in the PT estimates. What is striking -and this is why it is explicitly reported in the table -is the very high level of significance that the age-variable (defined as the age of democracy; with the US as the oldest democracy coded as 1) has for explaining differences in per capita output.
This means that the longer a country has been democratic, the higher the output per worker. The economic effect is huge: if a young democracy switched to being 200 years old (i.e. roughly the age of the U.S.), this would imply a threefold higher output per worker. This finding is at odds with Olson (1982) as PT also note (216). Above, we saw that it was often the details of the electoral systems that proved to be the most significant explanatory variables. This is why we substitute PIND and MAGN for MAJ to see if this is also true with regard to output per worker (table 8) .
And indeed, the results of PT prove to be extremely robust. 11 It seems noteworthy that after having increased the size of the sample and used more recent data for output per worker, the size of the coefficients for both PIND and MAGN markedly increases. We can, hence, be fairly confident that the details of the electoral system have a systematic impact on output per worker.
11
We were, however, unable to identify the reasons for the differences between colums 1 and 2 as we are here dealing with an exact replication of PT's estimate. 
Total Factor Productivity
Analyzing total factor productivity yields somewhat different results: A first look at table 9 shows that MAJ never reaches conventional significance levels when used to explain differences in total factor productivity. Neither an extension of the sample nor using more recent total factor productivity estimates changes anything here. Columns 7 and 8 contain a surprise, at least prima facie: in many of the results presented until now, the PRES variable did not reach conventional levels of significance, here, it becomes significant, the negative sign indicating that presidential regimes tend to be connected to lower levels of total factor productivity. In the estimates of PT, presidential regimes were correlated with both sounder fiscal policies and lower levels of political rents. In most of our replications, we did not find the PRES variable to have significant effects on these two groups of variables. Based on these results, one could have predicted that presidential regimes should not have any significant effect on total factor productivity either. Yet, in our theoretical section, a number of arguments were presented according to which presidential regimes could be problematic, e.g. because the likelihood that a presidential regime becomes unconstitutional was predicted to be higher than the corresponding likelihood of a parliamentary regime. This reduces the degree of predictability of a regime and could have a number of effects that are detrimental to the development of total factor productivity. Paralleling the estimation strategy applied to labor productivity, MAJ is, again, substituted for PIND and MAGN (table 10) . Here, the significance of PIND crucially depends on the kind of modification carried out. Our attempt to exactly replicate the findings of PT already led to a higher level of significance which was almost maintained after the sample had been broadened by an additional eight observations.
As soon as the sample size was reduced (in order to be able to use the Golder variable instead of PT's PRES), PIND does not have additional explanatory power anymore.
This changes again as soon as more recent data for total factor productivity are used.
Both the coefficient as well as the standard error in columns 2 and 8 are roughly identical. The effect of district magnitude seems to be rather robust. There is one exception though: if Golder's presidential variable is used (column 6), MAGN also loses its significance. The residuals in two of the estimates (columns 3 and 7) are not normally distributed. Guyana and Romania are the outliers in these regressions (2.5 std.dev.). Golder 2005. In the theoretical section, the possibility that both labor as well as total factor productivity are impacted upon by fiscal policies and government effectiveness is alluded to. To test for this possibility empirically, we have simply included central government expenditure and graft as independent variables into the equations. It turns out that both PRES and MAJ remain insignificant for explaining variation in both labor as well as total factor productivity but that GRAFT is highly significant for explaining differences between countries (on the one percent level for LOGYL and the five percent level for LOGA) whereas central government expenditures do not display a significant influence on productivity. In this specification, the AGE variable is not significant anymore, either.
To sum up: presidential systems seem to have a consistent negative impact on both forms of productivity although this result is not highly robust as the PRES variable does not consistently reach conventional levels of significance. Similarly, the MAJ variable always has a negative sign. Different from the PRES variable, it does, however, never reach conventional levels of significance. It is, however, noteworthy that a higher proportion of individually elected candidates (PIND) is robustly linked to higher levels of both labor and total factor productivity. Likewise, large districts implying higher levels of political competition are also linked with higher productivity levels. Additionally, the age of democracy seems to be highly -and positively -correlated with higher levels of productivity.
Conclusions and Outlook
In this paper, we have replicated and extended the analysis of Persson and Tabellini (2003) . The most important extension was that the sample size was increased from 85 to 116 countries. Other extensions include more recent data for the dependent variable (for graft, the corruption perception index, labor productivity and total factor productivity). Our most important result is that in most regressions, use of the extended dataset makes the variable for presidential regimes insignificant. PT's results with regard to electoral systems are, however, largely confirmed.
These results do not lack a certain irony. The central question was, after all: Do constitutional rules matter? It seems that it is the details of the electoral systems that matter most. This is ironic as in many (if not most) countries, these details are not dealt with on the level of the constitution. The result also teaches us that God is in the details in the sense that it is not the coarse MAJ variable that is most significant but rather the specifics of the electoral system.
If it is the more fine-grained variables that prove most significant with regard to the electoral system, could it not be that something similar is true with regard to forms of government? Potential variables could include aspects such as whether the president is elected directly or indirectly and whether his term is renewable or not. Getting even more fine-grained, one could ask for the exact electoral formula that is used to elect a president (plurality, absolute majority, qualified majority in case of direct elections;
composition of the electoral college in case of indirect elections).
In the theoretical section, the possibility that the factual implementation of institutions is not equivalent with their de jure status has been mentioned. PT's dataset is, however, largely based on de jure institutions. It would seem worthwhile to think up controls to ensure that de jure and de facto institutions are congruent.
In section 3.1, four possible extensions of the original results are discussed. In this paper, we have largely confined ourselves to one dimension, namely to the sample size and the coding of the explanatory variables. Natural next steps that suggest themselves include the empirical identification of the transmission channels through which the electoral system has such important effects on the three groups of variables. Another extension consists in endogenizing the constitutional variables.
This promises to be extremely important as only an endogenization of the relevant variables will get us closer to answering the central question asked by PT, namely do constitutional rules matter? As of now, we cannot exclude that it is not the constitutional institutions that drive the results but rather third variables which might determine both the constitutional variables as well as the economic effects. These could be informal institutions, ideologies, but also the kind of social capital on which societies can rely. In other words: we seem to have some way ahead of us before
being able to answer the question if -and to what degree -constitutional rules matter.
Moving to the more mundane, it seems highly desirable to extend the analysis to other constitutional institutions beyond the two institutions explicitly analyzed by PT:
The effects of direct democracy as well as of federalism immediately come to mind.
Other institutions that may be not as obvious include bicameralism, but also spending limits, term limits, and supreme audit institutions. St. Lucia 0 The King (Queen) of England is head of state which is represented by a governor which only acts after having been asked to do so by a cabinet which is directly accountable to Parliament; hence PRES = 0.
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Suriname 1
The President heads the executive. It is accountable to Parliament according to art. 90 of the constitution but can only be forced to retire after committing crimes or in case of serious illness, hence PRES = 1.
Vanuatu 0 Government consists of the prime minister and the other ministers. According to art. 43 of the constitution, Parliament can depose the government by a vote of no confidence, hence PRES = 0. 
List of Variables (definitions and sources)
The data describing the 85 countries covered by Persson and Tabellini (PT) taken out of the dataset that they have made available (http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/folder.php?vedi=823&tbn=albero&id_folder=180). The additional 31 countries were coded closely following the PT definitions. All variables used in this paper are described here, again closely following PT.
AFRICA:
Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in Africa, 0 otherwise; source: CIA (2005) 
AGE:
Age of democracy defined as AGE = (2000 -DEM_AGE) / 200, with values varying between 0 und 1.
ASIAE:
Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in East Asia, 0 otherwise; source: Golder (2005) .
AVELF:
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fractionalized) averaging five sources; source: La Porta (1999) .
CATHO80:
Percentage of a country's population belonging to the Roman Catholic religion in 1980 (younger states are counted based on their average from 1990 to 1995); source: La Porta (1999) and CIA (2005) for Lithuania, Nauru, Marshall Islands and San Marino.
CGEXP:
Central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, constructed using the item Government Finance-Expenditures in the IFS, divided by GDP at current prices and multiplied by 100; source: International Monetary Fund (2006) : International Financial Statistics Online Service.
CGREV:
Central government revenues as a percentage of GDP, constructed using the item Government Finance-Revenues in the IFS, divided by GDP at current prices and multiplied by 100; source: International Monetary Fund (2006) : International Financial Statistics Online Service.
CLIST:
Dummy variable for closed party lists taking on 0 if the list is open and 1 if it is closed. Sources are constitutions, electoral laws, election reports and other internet sources.
COL_ESP:
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is a former colony of Spain or Portugal, 0 otherwise; source: CIA (2005) .
COL_ESPA:
Spanish colonial origin, discounted by the number of years since independence (T_INDEP) and defined as COL_ESPA = COL_ESP * (250 -T_INDEP) / 250.
COL_OTH:
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country is a former colony of a country other than Spain, Portugal or the United Kingdom, 0 otherwise; source: CIA (2005) .
COL_OTHA:
Defined as COL_OTHA = COL_OTH * (250 -T_INDEP) / 250; see also COL_ESPA.
COL_UK:
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country is a former U.K. colony, 0 otherwise, source: CIA (2005) .
COL_UKA:
Defined as COL_UKA = COL_UK * (250 -T_INDEP) / 250; see also COL_ESPA.
CONFU:
Dummy variable for the religious tradition in a country, equal to 1 if the majority of the country's population is Confucian/Buddhist/Zen, 0 otherwise; source: CIA (2000) .
CPI0005:
Corruption Perception Index measuring perceptions of abuse of power by public officials. Average over 2000 -2005. Index values between 0 and 10, lower values meaning lower levels of corruption (recoded from the original version); source:
Transparency International and Internet Center for Corruption Research (http://www.icgg.org/).
CPI0005_WT:
Weighted CPI0005. Weight is 1/(Std. Dev. of single surveys within CPI0005).
CPI9500:
Like CPI0005 but average for the period 1995 -2000; source: Transparency International and Internet Center for Corruption Research (http://www.icgg.org/).
CPI9500_WT:
Weighted CPI9500. Weight is 1/(Std. Dev. of single surveys within CPI9500).
DATASET:
Dummy variable with 0 for countries covered in PT, 1 for all additional countries.
DEM_AGE:
First year of democratic rule in a country, corresponding to the first year of a string of positive yearly values of the variable POLITY for that country that continues uninterrupted until the end of the sample, given that the country was also an independent nation during the entire time period. Does not count foreign occupation during WW II as an interruption of democracy; source: additions on the basis of the variable NEWDEM (Golder 2005 ) that identifies the year of a first democractic election in that country.
DISTRICTS:
Number of electoral districts in a country; source: Variable DISCTRICTS from Golder (2005) .
EDUGER:
Total enrollment in primary and secondary education as a percentage of the relevant age group in the country's population;
source: UNESCO (2006) : Education statistics.
ENGFRAC:
Fraction of a country's population that speaks English as a native language; source: Hall & Jones (1999) .
